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The Modal Argument Improved 
1. Introduction 
Perhaps the most important argument against materialism is the modal argument. In its 
standard form, the modal argument relies on a compatibility thesis along the following lines 
(here ‘P’ stands for the conjunction of all physical truths): 
(Compatibility) P is compatible with the absence of consciousness. That is: ◊(P & there is 
no consciousness). 
In some formulations of the argument, Compatibility is treated as a premise directly supported 
by modal intuition. In other formulations, it is derived from a further premise about 
conceivability together with some principle linking conceivability to possibility. In others, it is 
derived from the premise that the phenomenal truths are not deducible from P, together with a 
principle linking deducibility to possibility. But these differences will not matter much for our 
purposes. 
The route from Compatibility to the falsity of materialism is fairly straightforward. 
Although there are delicate questions about how to define materialism, it is generally agreed that 
materialism entails a modal thesis to the effect that every (positive) truth is metaphysically 
necessitated by the conjunction of physical truths. That consciousness exists is, I shall assume, a 
(positive) truth about our world. Thus, if P is compatible with the absence of consciousness, it 
follows that P fails to metaphysically necessitate some positive truth about our world, so 
materialism is false. We’ll call this the ‘standard modal argument’.1 
In this paper, I propose an alternative modal argument that relies on a somewhat different 
modal premise. Instead of a compatibility thesis, my argument relies on an incompatibility thesis: 
                                                          
1 For classic presentations of the modal argument in roughly this form, see Campbell 1970, Kirk 1974, Kripke 1980, 
and Chalmers 1996. 
(Incompatibility) The existence of consciousness is incompatible with the completeness 
of the physical truths. That is: □(P is complete ⊃ there is no consciousness). 
The notion of completeness can be understood either modally or ground-theoretically. In the 
modal sense, a class of truths is complete, or amounts to a ‘complete description of reality’, iff its 
members jointly entail (metaphysically necessitate) all positive truths. In the ground-theoretic 
sense, a class of truths is complete iff every positive truth outside that class is fully grounded in 
members of that class. The ground-theoretic definition gives a somewhat stronger notion of 
completeness, at least given the orthodox assumption that (full) grounding entails metaphysical 
necessitation (Rosen 2010, Fine 2012). The ground-theoretic definition may also have some 
minor advantages over the modal definition. For example, it may better capture the intuitive 
notion of a ‘complete description of reality’, and it yields a logically weaker and slightly more 
plausible Incompatibility thesis – a fact that will have some relevance in §3. However, the 
differences between the two definitions will not matter a great deal for our purposes, and to 
simplify our discussion, I shall use ‘completeness’ in accordance with the modal definition 
unless otherwise specified, mentioning the ground-theoretic notion only where the differences 
matter to the argument. 
As with the standard modal argument, the route from our modal premise to the denial of 
materialism is straightforward. As we’ve seen, materialism is standardly taken to entail that the 
physical truths are (modally) complete. Hence, given Incompatibility together with the modest 
assumption that consciousness exists (the same assumption needed to bridge the logical gap 
between Compatibility and the falsity of materialism), we may conclude that materialism is 
false.2 We’ll call this the ‘revised modal argument’. 
                                                          
2 If completeness is taken in the ground-theoretic sense, we will also need the (fairly innocuous) assumption that 
materialism entails that phenomenal truths are either physical truths or grounded in physical truths. 
I take Incompatibility to have a great deal of intuitive support. Tell me whatever you like 
about the way particles and fields are distributed across space and time. There is a powerful 
intuition that, if any such description amounted to an exhaustive characterization of the world, 
there would be no consciousness. But it is not my purpose to persuade anyone of the truth of 
Incompatibility or the falsity of materialism. My goal is rather to show that the revised modal 
argument is strictly superior to the standard modal argument in the following sense: Anyone who 
accepts the premises of the standard modal argument must accept the premises of the revised 
modal argument, but not vice versa. Since the only difference between the two arguments lies in 
their modal premises, this amounts to the claim that everyone who accepts the modal premise of 
the standard modal argument (Compatibility) must accept the modal premise of the revised 
modal argument (Incompatibility), but not vice versa. More specifically, I show that there are 
several anti-materialist views, including reasonable versions of idealism, Russellian monism, 
interactionist dualism, and theism, that are inconsistent with the modal premise of the standard 
modal argument but perfectly consistent with the premises of the revised modal argument. Those 
who accept, or are merely unwilling to rule out, any one of these views cannot endorse the 
standard modal argument, but can happily endorse the revised modal argument. 
Now, this result might be insignificant if accepting Incompatibility necessarily came with 
a commitment to Compatibility, as would be the case if the only possible reason for accepting 
Incompatibility were a prior acceptance of Compatibility. But there is no reason to think this is 
true. As we’ll see, one can derive Incompatibility from Compatibility, so a prior acceptance of 
Compatibility could be one’s reason for accepting Incompatibility. But one could also accept 
Incompatibility simply because the existence of consciousness seems to one clearly to conflict 
with the idea that the physical truths exhaustively describe reality. And one could coherently 
make this judgment while denying or remaining neutral with respect to Compatibility (perhaps 
because one accepts, or is merely unwilling to rule out, one of the views described in §3). By 
analogy, consider a similar pair of claims about geometry and colour. Letting G stand for the 
conjunction of all purely geometric truths, we can distinguish two modal theses: 
(G-Compatibility) G is compatible with the absence of colour. That is: ◊(G & nothing is 
coloured). 
(G-Incompatibility) The completeness of G is incompatible with the existence of colour. 
That is: □(G is complete ⊃ nothing is coloured). 
One might accept G-Incompatibility just because the existence of colour seems to one clearly to 
conflict with the idea that the geometric truths constitute an exhaustive characterization of 
reality. But suppose one also accepts, or is merely unwilling to rule out, Berkeley’s thesis that 
nothing can have extension without having some colour or other. Then one must reject, or be 
agnostic about, G-Compatibility (since G logically implies the existence of extended things). 
There does not seem to be anything incoherent or epistemically unstable in this combination of 
attitudes. 
 Or consider an analogous pair of modal claims concerning the ‘Humean’ truths (truths 
about the distribution of local categorical qualities across space and time) and the existence of 
causation. Letting H stand for the conjunction of Humean truths, we can distinguish two modal 
theses: 
(H-Compatibility) H is compatible with the absence of causation. That is: ◊(H & there is 
no causation). 
(H-Incompatibility) The completeness of H is incompatible with the existence of 
causation. That is: □(H is complete ⊃ there is no causation). 
Again, one might accept H-Incompatibility just because the existence of causation seems to one 
clearly to be incompatible with the idea that the Humean truths provide an exhaustive account of 
reality (pace Lewis 1986: ix-x). But suppose one also accepts, or is merely unwilling to rule out, 
a version of the principle of sufficient reason that denies the possibility of uncaused property 
instantiations. Then one must reject, or be agnostic about, H-Compatibility (since H logically 
implies that there are property instantiations). Again, there does not seem to be anything 
incoherent or epistemically unstable about this combination of attitudes. 
2. Everyone who accepts Compatibility must accept Incompatibility 
Here’s a quick proof that Compatibility entails Incompatibility: Suppose Compatibility is 
true. We’ll let w be an arbitrary world at which P completely describes reality (if there are no 
such worlds, then Incompatibility is vacuously true), and we’ll assume for reductio that 
consciousness exists at w. Since P is a complete description of reality at w – that is, since P 
entails every (positive) truth that holds at w – it follows from this assumption that P entails that 
consciousness exists. But the claim that P entails the existence of consciousness is equivalent to 
the negation of Compatibility. Thus, given Compatibility, it follows that any world at which P is 
complete is a world without consciousness. In other words, it follows that Incompatibility is true. 
3. Not Everyone who accepts Incompatibility must accept Compatibility 
While everyone who accepts Compatibility must accept Incompatibility, the converse 
doesn’t hold. I myself, for example, accept Incompatibility, but I am agnostic about 
Compatibility. In accepting Incompatibility, I accept that if there are any possible worlds in 
which P completely describes reality, these worlds are devoid of consciousness. Hence, I accept 
that if P could be complete, Compatibility is true.3 But I am agnostic about Compatibility, in 
part, because I have no idea whether P could be complete. More precisely, I am agnostic about 
Compatibility because, for all I know, (i) P couldn’t be complete, and (ii) for any proposition Q 
such that the conjunction of P and Q could be complete, P and Q jointly necessitate the existence 
of consciousness. 
To make this a bit less abstract, it will be helpful to describe some specific philosophical 
views such that, if one accepts them or merely refuses to rule them out, one can accept 
Incompatibility, but not Compatibility. I state four such views below, all of which implicitly 
deny the possible completeness of P. Each is described from the point of view of an imaginary 
proponent, named ‘the idealist’, ‘the Russellian monist’, ‘the interactionist dualist’, and ‘the 
theist’. (To be clear, the views described below are logically stronger than the general theses 
normally labeled ‘idealism’, ‘Russellian monism’, and so forth. They are, rather, specific 
versions of these general theses.) 
The Idealist: Necessarily, all physical truths (e.g., truths about the existence of tables, 
rocks, and electrons) are grounded in phenomenal truths (e.g., truths about table 
appearances, rock appearances, and appearances of electron-detection equipment). 
Moreover, the physical truths are, at least to a limited extent, multiply realizable with 
respect to underlying phenomenal truths, so the physical truths of our world might have 
been grounded in a slightly different pattern of phenomenal truths (e.g., a pattern of 
                                                          
3 A quick proof that Incompatibility plus the possible completeness of P entails Compatibility: let w be a world in 
which P is complete. From Incompatibility, we get that ~C holds at w. Thus, w verifies P&~C, which establishes 
Compatibility. 
experiences just like those in the actual world, but in which one visual sensation is 
slightly blurrier than in actuality).4 
On this view, physical truths are necessarily underwritten by consciousness, so P could not hold 
in the absence of consciousness. This view is therefore inconsistent with Compatibility. But it is 
consistent with Incompatibility. Indeed, it entails Incompatibility, for it entails that P could not 
be complete. Those who accept, or are merely unwilling to rule out, this form of idealism can 
therefore accept Incompatibility, but must be agnostic at best about Compatibility. Thus, those 
who wish to attack materialism while endorsing or remaining neutral on this alternative to 
materialism cannot use the standard modal argument, but can use the revised modal argument. 
The revised modal argument enjoys a modest additional advantage if we adopt the 
ground-theoretic definition of completeness. The points above would then also apply to a variant 
idealist view that denies that P could be grounded in a different set of phenomenal truths. Both 
idealist views are inconsistent with Compatibility. And given the asymmetry of grounding, both 
views entail that P couldn’t be ground-theoretically complete (the physical truths cannot ground 
their own phenomenal grounds), so Incompatibility comes out vacuously true. 
The Russellian Monist: Physical truths like P are entirely truths about structure and 
dynamics – truths concerning the causal, spatiotemporal, mathematical, and logical 
relations among entities, and the way these relationships evolve over time. But structural 
truths must have some non-structural, quidditative ground – some kind of intrinsic or 
categorical underpinning. In my view, the categorical underpinnings of the structural 
truths play an indispensable role in grounding consciousness.5 Now, the structural truths 
                                                          
4 Idealist views along these lines are defended by Adams (2007), Foster (2008), Yetter-Chappell (2017), and Segal 
and Goldschmidt (2017). 
5 For discussion of Russellian monist views along these lines, see Stoljar 2001, Alter and Nagasawa 2012, Chalmers 
2015, and Goff 2017. 
discovered by physics are, at least to a limited extent, multiply realizable. That is, the 
same physical truths could be grounded in a slightly different set of categorical qualities. 
But in my view, any set of quidditative truths sufficient to ground P would also suffice to 
ground consciousness of the kind we enjoy. 
Again, this view is inconsistent with Compatibility, for it implies that P could not hold in the 
absence of an appropriate quidditative basis, where any appropriate quidditative basis for P 
would suffice to ground consciousness. But it is consistent with Incompatibility. Indeed, it entails 
Incompatibility, for it entails that P could not be complete. Those who accept, or are merely 
unwilling to rule out, this form of Russellian monism can therefore accept Incompatibility, but 
must be agnostic at best about Compatibility. Thus, those who wish to attack materialism while 
endorsing or remaining neutral on this alternative to traditional materialism cannot use the 
standard modal argument, but can use the revised modal argument. 
Again, the revised modal argument enjoys a modest additional advantage if we adopt the 
ground-theoretic definition of completeness. The points above would then apply also to a variant 
Russellian monist view that denies that P could be grounded in a different set of quidditative 
truths, as some Russellian monists do (Coleman 2015: 94-5, Strawson 2017: 186, Hassel Mørch 
forthcoming.) Both Russellian monist views are inconsistent with Compatibility. And given the 
asymmetry of grounding, both Russellian monist views entail that P could not be ground-
theoretically complete (the physical truths cannot ground their own quidditative grounds), so 
Incompatibility comes out vacuously true. 
The Interactionist Dualist: Consciousness is a non-physical process, but it has a (non-
redundant) causal influence on physical processes in our brains. Now, I accept a version 
of the principle of sufficient reason according to which the actual physical effects of 
conscious states could not occur uncaused, though they could have had different 
conscious causes. Since (on my view) there are only two possible types of events, 
physical events and conscious events, the physical events that occur in human brains 
cannot occur in the absence of either a physical cause or a conscious cause. 
This view also is inconsistent with Compatibility. For assume the view is correct. Now consider 
some physical event in my brain – say, an electron swerve – that is (non-redundantly) caused by 
a conscious state, and let us suppose for reductio that there exists a possible world w that 
duplicates all the physical truths of our world but is devoid of consciousness. Since w duplicates 
all the actual physical truths, w includes the electron swerve. Moreover, in w, the swerve will 
lack a physical cause – because the swerve lacks a physical cause in our world, and w is exactly 
like our world in physical respects. And, of course, it will also lack a conscious cause, since w is 
stipulated to be devoid of consciousness. Now, according to the view described above, the only 
possible kinds of occurrences are physical occurrences and conscious occurrences. Since neither 
type causes the swerve in w, the swerve must be uncaused in w, contradicting the view’s 
commitment to the principle of sufficient reason. The view described above is therefore 
inconsistent with Compatibility. But it is consistent with – and, indeed, entails the vacuous truth 
of – Incompatibility. Those who accept, or are unwilling to rule out this form of interactionist 
dualism, can therefore accept Incompatibility, but must be agnostic at best about Compatibility. 
So, as before, those who wish to attack materialism while accepting or remaining neutral on this 
alternative to materialism cannot consistently use the standard modal argument, but can use the 
revised modal argument. 
Again, the revised modal argument enjoys a modest additional advantage if we adopt the 
ground-theoretic definition of completeness. The points above would then also apply to any form 
of dualism (whether epiphenomenalist or interactionist) that endorses necessitarianism about the 
psychophysical laws, so that the physical events mentioned in P necessarily cause, but do not 
ground, consciousness of exactly the kind we find in our world. Each of these forms of dualism 
is inconsistent with Compatibility. And each entails that P cannot be ground-theoretically 
complete (since they entail that physical truths can’t ground consciousness and that P cannot 
hold without consciousness), so Incompatibility comes out vacuously true. 
The Theist: God exists necessarily, and necessarily, all contingent facts are caused by 
God’s creative activity. Because God is essentially good and wise, there are certain 
conceivable scenarios that are impossible only because it would be contrary to God’s 
goodness and wisdom to create them. For example, a scenario in which a virtuous person 
suffers forever, with no greater good arising from her suffering, is perfectly conceivable, 
but is impossible, because it is contrary to God’s essential goodness to create it.6 The 
same goes, in my view, for a scenario in which P holds in the absence of consciousness. 
Truths about consciousness are neither identical to nor grounded in any physical truths, 
and a zombie world of this sort is perfectly conceivable. But it is not possible, because 
God would not create it. After all, a universe without consciousness, a universe with only 
unthinking and unfeeling matter, would be a universe without any meaning or value. 
Such a universe would be profoundly pointless, a kind of cosmic farce, and it is 
unbefitting of God’s goodness and wisdom to create such a world. 
This view, again, is clearly inconsistent with the Compatibility.7 But it is consistent with 
Incompatibility, and in fact entails the vacuous truth of Incompatibility given the assumption that 
                                                          
6 Closely related claims are defended in Morris 1987, Plantinga 2004, and Kray 2011. 
7 There may be a trivial sense in which theism by itself, without any assumptions about what God would or wouldn’t 
create, conflicts with Compatibility, at least if God himself is necessarily conscious. If God is necessarily conscious, 
it follows trivially that P couldn’t hold in the absence of consciousness. But this is a fairly uninteresting point of 
some positive truths about God, or some specific phenomenal truths about his creation, can vary 
across worlds while holding P fixed. Those who accept, or are unwilling to rule out, this form of 
theism, can therefore accept Incompatibility, but must be agnostic at best about Compatibility. 
Thus, those who wish to attack materialism while accepting or remaining neutral on this theistic 
view cannot use the standard modal argument, but can use the revised modal argument. 
 Once again, the revised modal argument enjoys a modest additional advantage if we 
adopt the ground-theoretic definition of completeness. The points above would then apply also to 
a variant form of theism according to which P necessitates (but doesn’t ground) all positive 
truths, including all truths about God and all specific phenomenal truths. Both forms of theism 
are inconsistent with Compatibility. And each entails that P couldn’t be ground-theoretically 
complete (since each implies that the truths about consciousness – and presumably also the truths 
about God – couldn’t be grounded in the physical truths), so Incompatibility comes out 
vacuously true. 
 It’s worth noting that some of the views above require the assumption that P is 
compatible with the falsity of some actual phenomenal truths, even if it is not compatible with 
the absence of consciousness altogether. This is clearest in the case of the idealist, who assumes 
that we can hold P fixed while making small changes to its phenomenal basis. She will therefore 
accept a weaker compatibility thesis, according to which P is compatible (not with the falsity of 
C, the proposition that consciousness exists, but) with the falsity of C*, the conjunction of all 
actual phenomenal truths. In fact, the idealist must accept the possibility of P&~C* if she wishes 
to accept Incompatibility on its modal construal (that is, with ‘completeness’ understood modally 
rather than ground-theoretically). If the idealist held that P&~C* is impossible (say, because she 
                                                          
conflict between theism and the standard modal argument, which can be sidestepped simply by changing the 
compatibility premise to something like ‘Possibly, P and there is no non-divine consciousness.’ 
thought that P couldn’t be grounded in a different set of phenomenal truths), it would presumably 
follow that P is (modally) complete, and hence that Incompatibility is false. Something similar 
arguably goes for the interactionist dualist. If she claims that P&~C* is impossible (as might be 
the case if the causal roles played by our phenomenal states couldn’t be played by different 
phenomenal states, or if necessitarianism holds for the psychophysical laws), this would arguably 
commit her to the claim that P is (modally) complete, and hence that Incompatibility is false. 
Thus, while proponents of these views will not endorse the standard modal argument, they may 
have to endorse a variation on it that replaces Compatibility with the weaker compatibility thesis 
that P&~C* is possible – at least if they wish to accept Incompatibility on its modal construal. 
 Still, the revised modal argument retains significant advantages even over this variation 
on the standard modal argument. First, the idealist and the dualist are only committed to the 
possibility P&~C* if they wish to accept the modal construal of Incompatibility. There are 
versions of idealism and dualism, already mentioned above, that reject the possibility of P&~C* 
while endorsing the ground-theoretic construal of Incompatibility – for example, dualist views 
that accept necessitarianism about the psychophysical laws, and idealist views that deny that P 
could have been grounded in a different set of phenomenal truths. (The same goes, of course, for 
the theist who embraces necessitarian dualism, and the Russellian monist who denies that P 
could have been grounded in a different set of quidditative truths. Both deny the possibility of 
P&~C* while accepting the vacuous truth of the ground-theoretic reading of Incompatibility.) 
This highlights an advantage of the ground-theoretic construal of the revised modal argument 
over the modal construal: The former relies on a logically weaker Incompatibility premise, one 
that can be accepted with fewer commitments regarding the exact modal relationship between 
the physical and the phenomenal. 
Second, not all the views above require the possibility of P&~C* even to accept the 
modal construal of Incompatibility. For example, the Russellian monist does not need to accept 
the possibility of P&~C* to accept Incompatibility on its modal reading. She can hold that P is 
compatible with some variation in the quidditative truths (so P won’t be modally complete), but 
not with any variation in the phenomenal truths (so P&~C* will be impossible). This is 
consistent so long as the quidditative truths – the base-level truths with respect to which our 
conscious states are multiply realizable – are merely ‘protophenomenal’ rather than phenomenal. 
Likewise, the theist does not require the possibility of P&~C* in order to accept the modal 
construal of Incompatibility. For example, she might combine necessitarian dualism (which 
implies the impossibility of P&~C*) with the claim that P couldn’t be (modally) complete 
(which implies Incompatibility), perhaps on the grounds that God’s own positive properties can 
vary across worlds that hold fixed the truth of P. 
4. Conclusion 
 To summarize: I’ve argued that the revised modal argument is strictly superior to the 
standard modal argument, in the sense that the key modal premise of the revised argument is 
more modest – logically weaker – and is consistent with a range of reasonable anti-materialist 
views that are ruled out by the standard modal argument. Those who accept, or are merely 
unwilling to rule out, any one of these views cannot make use of the standard modal argument in 
their objections to materialism. But they may avail themselves of the revised modal argument.8 
References 
Adams, R. 2007. Idealism vindicated. In Persons: Human and Divine, ed. P. van Inwagen and D. 
Zimmerman, 35–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
                                                          
8 Thanks to Jeff Speaks, Galen Strawson, and Hedda Hassel Mørch for helpful discussion, and to two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments. 
Alter, T. and Y. Nagasawa. 2012. What is Russellian monism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 
19: 67–95. 
Campbell, K. 1970. Body and Mind. London: Macmillan. 
Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Chalmers, D. 2015. Panpsychism and panprotopsychism. In Consciousness in a Physical World: 
Perspectives on Russellian Monism, ed. T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa, 246–76. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Coleman, S. 2015. Neurocosmology. In Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and 
Consciousness, ed. P. Coates and S. Coleman, 66–102. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fine, K. 2012. Guide to ground. In Metaphysical Grounding, ed. F. Correia and B. Schnieder, 
37–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Foster, J. 2008. A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Goff, P. 2017. Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hassel Mørch, H. forthcoming. The phenomenal powers view and the meta-problem of 
consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 
Kirk, R. 1974 Sentience and behaviour. Mind 83: 43–60. 
Kray, K. 2011. Theism and Modal Collapse. American Philosophical Quarterly 48: 361–72. 
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lewis, D. 1986 Philosophical Papers: Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morris, T. 1987. The necessity of God’s goodness. In Anselmian Explorations: Essays in 
Philosophical Theology, ed. T. Morris, 42–69. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
Plantinga, A. 2004. Supralapsarianism, or ‘O felix culpa’. In Christian Faith and the Problem of 
Evil, ed. P. van Inwagen, 1–25. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co. 
Rosen, G. 2010 Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction.” In Modality: Metaphysics, 
Logic, and Epistemology, ed. B. Hale & A. Hoffmann, 109–36. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Segal, A. and T. Goldschmidt. 2017. The necessity of idealism. In Idealism: New Essays in 
Metaphysics, ed. T. Goldschmidt and K. Pearce, 34–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stoljar, D. 2001. Two conceptions of the physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
62: 253–81. 
Strawson, G. 2017. Conceivability and the silence of physics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 
24: 167–92. 
Yetter-Chappell, H. 2017. Idealism without God. In Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, T. 
Goldschmidt and K. Pearce, 66–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
